Hi Vito,
Thanks for sharing your opinion on this matter, i.e., collaborative reporting of say, any phase of a project in progress, or post-project completion. Our profession's history of horrific failures appears to be driven by the lack of early identification out loud. While error-free outcomes are expected, given the variety of a project's professional workgroup's knowledge and experiences, allowing such to be walled-off under the guise of "only the PIC may rule over, and contain situations of potential failure of various types" has proven to be unreliable to prevent the repetition of known restraining forces to success.
I will close for now given the complexity of this issue to "Solve it" in a few words without collaboration.
I recently reviewed the 1999 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, "To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System,"[1] revealed that between 44,000 and 98,000 people die every year in U.S. hospitals because of medical errors. Even more disturbing, communication failures are the leading root cause of the sentinel events reported to the Joint Commission from 1995 to 2004.
Traditional medical education emphasizes the importance of error-free practice, utilizing intense peer pressure to achieve perfection during both diagnosis and treatment. Errors are therefore perceived normatively as an expression of failure. This atmosphere creates an environment that precludes the fair, open discussion of mistakes required if organizational [profession-wide] learning is to take place. In the early 1990s, Donald Berwick wrote about patients needing an open communication system instead of experiencing adverse events stemming from communication failures."
If I may suggest, let's hold off on asserting what such collaboration may or may not do for now.
Here is where a cross-functional task force[2] could add value to the dialogue.
"If You Always Do What You've Always Done, You'll Always Get What You've Always Got."
~ Henry Ford.
Stay Healthy!
Cheers,
Bill
[1] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2637/#ch33.s9
[2] Including non-CEs.
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William M. Hayden Jr., Ph.D., P.E., CMQ/OE, F.ASCE
Buffalo, N.Y.
"It is never too late to be what you might have been." -- George Eliot 1819 - 1880
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Original Message:
Sent: 08-25-2021 03:02 PM
From: Vito Rotondi
Subject: Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions
Well, one either is or is not a professional in responsible charge. How can we allow the profession to dilute itself? The idea of collaborative reporting or any collaboration without an individual irresponsible charge is dilution. Dilution only exasperates the problem. So we should adhere to the principles that made engineering worthwhile. Allowing the profession to be commoditized will only lead to the race to the bottom.
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Vito Rotondi, (Retired)
Arch. S.E. P.E. M ASCE
Westmont Illinois
Original Message:
Sent: 08-25-2021 04:53 AM
From: William Hayden
Subject: Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions
Hi Gregory.
Thought you may be interested in an ASCE paper on the topic from 2007.
Stay Healthy!
Cheers,
Bill
"Ethics in Engineering Practice: How Easy It Becomes to See in the Dark,"
Leadership Manage. Eng., 2007, 7(4): 151-157
Change is an expected part of life, certainly where individual and group behavior is involved. The author addresses the change in professional conduct behaviors over the past forty-five years that have played a significant part in the public's lack of respect for, and the resultant treatment of, much of civil engineering work as a price-based commodity. The point is made that a profession is defined as being both self-governing and self-regulating. It appears that over time the levels of self-regulation, and correspondingly, of public trust with civil engineers, are significantly lower than desired. Nowhere does civil engineering exist in a vacuum.
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William M. Hayden Jr., Ph.D., P.E., CMQ/OE, F.ASCE
Buffalo, N.Y.
"It is never too late to be what you might have been." -- George Eliot 1819 - 1880
Original Message:
Sent: 08-23-2021 07:46 PM
From: Gregory Szuladzinski
Subject: Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions
William, I was amazed when you listed all circumstances that prevent engineers from telling the truth.
The way of progress is to enforce telling the truth. I know it may not be easy.
Sincerely
GS
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Dr Gregory Szuladzinski
Director
Analytical Service Co
Northbridge, NSW, Australia
Original Message:
Sent: 08-21-2021 11:02 AM
From: William Hayden
Subject: Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions
- ASCE Rises To The Challenge!
As the June 24 collapse of the Champlain Towers South condominium building in Surfside, Florida, sends society in search of answers, one structural engineering safeguard already in place may lie in the power of collaborative reporting. Glenn Bell, P.E., S.E., C.Eng, F.SEI, Dist.M.ASCE, and Andrew Herrmann, P.E., F.SEI, Pres.12.ASCE, started CROSS-US (Collaborative Reporting on Structural Safety) in 2019 to collect, review, and publish issues and incidents regarding structural safety.
Andrew Herrmann: "In the United States, engineers are inhibited by their insurance companies and lawyers. So, if you happen to make a mistake or if you have something that's not working well, you're inhibited from talking about it. So, with CROSS, the confidentiality means that things can be brought to light so that other people can learn from mistakes. That's the importance of it; that's the beauty of it."
Stay Healthy!
Cheers,
Bill
[1] https://source.asce.org/the-key-to-structural-safety-may-be-collaborative-reporting/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=rasa_io&PostID=34082090&MessageRunDetailID=6105557211
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William M. Hayden Jr., Ph.D., P.E., CMQ/OE, F.ASCE
Buffalo, N.Y.
"It is never too late to be what you might have been." -- George Eliot 1819 - 1880
Original Message:
Sent: 07-28-2021 01:39 PM
From: William Hayden
Subject: Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions
Hi Dr. Szuladzinski, I agree with your observation "The key to understand this or any other collapse is structural mechanics" but think there is more. I think we also need to factually understand the "Why?"
To answer that question, we must go back "Upstream in time" over that structure's timeline. Most responses to this post to date focus on the possible engineering causes that resulted in the "Sudden Collapse" of the Florida Condo. Forensic engineers who will do the detailed analysis based on facts will have the most credible answers to this horrific collapse. However, history has shown that for other fatal structural collapses, the records provide information that while engineers and others had earlier knowledge of the real potential for structural failure, those individuals choose not to report such to authorities. And, if immediate action was not taken by officials, to the public-at-large.
While no point made herein is known to be an issue for the Florida Condo failure, such useful insights would be valuable if placed in an accessible database for engineers going forward with other projects.
However, in past cases of horrific structural failures, there appeared to be a reluctance to do so because these engineers and others:
1. Believe their loyalty starts and ends with their client.
2. The past history of "Career Collapse" when engineers did report such findings.
3. Liability of engineers reporting such issues.
4. Organizational and technical causes for failures will reflect negatively, with potential legal exposure.
5. While the ultimate failure was technical in nature, such was actually driven upstream in the process by decisions made to protect the reputation of the firm(s) and/or the individuals involved.
6. Non-enforcement of building codes and/or construction regulations,
7. Challenges on the issue of building collapse is that individuals differ radically from one another on the professional(s) to blame as the major cause of the collapse of a building, loss of lives, and properties.
8. The non-enforcement of existing laws and building codes.
9. Professionals did not ensure proper supervision of workmen and efficient checking of materials before incorporation into building works.
While none of the above comments are known at this time to be applicable to the Florida Condo collapse, they do suggest that upstream research of what preceded the actual collapse may be of great value to other engineers as they continue to design and build facilities.
Perhaps one planned output of the actual study results will be publishing its findings to the benefit of engineers who design and construct facilities going forward in an open database.
Stay Healthy!
Cheers,
Bill
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William M. Hayden Jr., Ph.D., P.E., CMQ/OE, F.ASCE
Buffalo, N.Y.
"It is never too late to be what you might have been." -- George Eliot 1819 - 1880
Original Message:
Sent: 07-19-2021 02:34 AM
From: Gregory Szuladzinski
Subject: Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions
The key to understand this or any other collapse is structural mechanics. Computer programs such as SAP
or its several derivatives help us to build safe structures. But a collapse analysis demands something
more sophisticated. If you want examples of such work, please go to
https://www.youtube.com/user/gs98765432
Performing such simulations gives us a better insight into needs for modifying certain elements.
Sincerely
Gregory Szuladzinski
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Gregory Szuladzinski Ph.D., M.ASCE
Director
Analytical Service Pty, Ltd.
Northbridge NSW
Original Message:
Sent: 07-01-2021 01:41 PM
From: Mitchell Winkler
Subject: Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions
Recognizing we want to be careful in the forum about speculating on the cause of the Surfside condo collapse aligned with the ASCE statement that came out earlier this week, a number of general questions have been circulating in my head that triggered by the facts that have come to light. As engineers how we can we better communicate the severity of problems balancing being alarmist (and possibly putting future credibility and opportunities at risk) with need to properly inform? This is compounded by oft having to communicate to clients or others that are non-engineers and do understand meaning or subtleties. For policy and regulation makers I think there's a question of how to compel action. The Surfside condo collapse has highlighted the challenge dealing with diffuse ownership. The final question is one of engineering competency within government entities. Finally, can this tragedy be used a wake up call to catalyze support for addressing this countries failing infrastructure – and systems that enable?
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Mitch Winkler P.E., M.ASCE
Houston, TX
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