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It will be days before we know the full extent of the devastation to Louisiana from Hurricane Ida as well as to the other states in the storm's path. Prompted by the eerie timing of Hurricane Ida's landfall, 16 years to the day from when Hurricane Katrina struck, I thought It was timely to pose the following questions.

Are folks aware of the report prepared by the ASCE following Katrina titled What Went Wrong and Why? The report prepared by the Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel (ERP) offers an assessment of what happened to the New Orleans hurricane protection system as a result of Hurricane Katrina-and why it happened. A finding from this report: "The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina also have profound implications for other American communities and a sobering message for people nationwide: we must place the protection of public safety, health, and welfare at the forefront of our nations priorities."

The ERP report contains 10 calls to action (summarized below for convenience). Are the issues behind what went wrong and these suggested fixes limited to New Orleans, the USACE, or do they have more widespread implications? Can these issues happen elsewhere? For those in the know, have they been adequately addressed relative to the New Orleans hurricane protection system?

Is what happened in New Orleans an example of what Bill Hayden in his excellent essay – referenced under the  Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions  thread – describes as being able to see in the dark? in brief, this is about normalizing behaviors and practices that fall on the fringe, or beneath ethical norms. The journal reference for convenience is "Ethics in Engineering Practice: How Easy It Becomes to See in the Dark," Leadership Manage. Eng., 2007, 7(4): 151-157

I was living in River Ridge LA at the time Katrina. River Ridge is located between the airport and city but well outside the zone that was flooded by the failures to the hurricane and water retention systems that existed at the time. I took significant interest at the time in the multiple investigations that were conducted. While the USACE was responsible for the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System (or at least a large part of it) I think it pays for all of us to take notice of what happened and ask can it happen again somewhere else – under somebody else's watch - and how can it be prevented.

ERP Report Calls to Action Summary

Call to action Number 1: Keep safety at the forefront of public priorities.  All Responsible agencies in NO and throughout the nation should re-evaluate their policies and practices to ensure that protection of public safety, health and welfare is the top priority and the infrequent but potentially devastating impacts from hurricanes and flooding.

Call to action Number 3:  Quantify the Risks. The USACE should complete the work necessary to quantify and effectively communicate the risk as soon as possible, and, because risk assessment and communication is not static, should periodically update the assessment of risk. This risk assessment approach should be extended to all areas of the nation that are vulnerable to major losses from hurricanes and flooding.

Call to action Number 3:  Communicate the risks to the public and decide how much risk is acceptable. Local, state, and federal agencies should create and maintain quality programs of public risk communication in New Orleans and other areas threatened by hurricanes and flooding

Call to action Number 4: Rethink the whole system, including land use in New Orleans.  Local, state, and federal leaders should review the overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into  a coherent and well-thought-out system.

Call to action Number 5: Correct the deficiencies. Local, state, and federal leaders should review the overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into a coherent and well-thought-out system.

Call to action Number 6: Put someone in charge. Local, state, and federal leaders should agree to assign to a single individual the responsibility for managing critical hurricane and flood protection systems such as the one in the New Orleans area.

Call to action Number 7: Improve interagency coordination. All agencies involved in the hurricane protection system should implement far better and more effective mechanisms for coordination  and cooperation.

Call to action Number 8: Upgrade engineering design procedures. The engineering community should review and update engineering design procedures for hurricane and flood protection systems to ensure that these updated procedures take all reasonable steps to protect the public safety, health, and welfare.

Call to action Number 9: Bring in independent experts. Agencies responsible for design of hurricane and flood protection systems and other critical life-safety structures should engage independent experts in high-level review of every project.

Call to action Number 10: Place safety first. ASCE, working in partnership with the USACE and other engineering organizations, should reinforce the need to place the safety, health, and welfare of the public first, and should communicate that public safety must always be the highest priority

The short answer is: apparently not.

I am saying this – because back in April 2019 we discussed the issue on Collaborate. The discussion followed the April 11, 2019 E&E News – where the author claimed: New Orleans Levees Sinking after Massive Upgrading.

ASCE's 10 calls to improve upon and learn from the catastrophic disaster caused by the August 2005 Hurricane Katrina (published in the Civil Engineering Magazine, 77(6), 2007) appear to be a general shopping list (although I presume, the EPR report itself have some details on the scientific justification of them). Because, the calls are something appear to be not much different than what one finds in most planning and design guidelines. By the way, the 10^th call appears to be a (somewhat) repetition of the 1^st call.

-----

Dilip

Website

ORCID ID

Google Scholar

It will be days before we know the full extent of the devastation to Louisiana from Hurricane Ida as well as to the other states in the storm's path. Prompted by the eerie timing of Hurricane Ida's landfall, 16 years to the day from when Hurricane Katrina struck, I thought It was timely to pose the following questions.

Are folks aware of the report prepared by the ASCE following Katrina titled What Went Wrong and Why? The report prepared by the Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel (ERP) offers an assessment of what happened to the New Orleans hurricane protection system as a result of Hurricane Katrina-and why it happened. A finding from this report: "The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina also have profound implications for other American communities and a sobering message for people nationwide: we must place the protection of public safety, health, and welfare at the forefront of our nations priorities."

The ERP report contains 10 calls to action (summarized below for convenience). Are the issues behind what went wrong and these suggested fixes limited to New Orleans, the USACE, or do they have more widespread implications? Can these issues happen elsewhere? For those in the know, have they been adequately addressed relative to the New Orleans hurricane protection system?

Is what happened in New Orleans an example of what Bill Hayden in his excellent essay – referenced under the  Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions  thread – describes as being able to see in the dark? in brief, this is about normalizing behaviors and practices that fall on the fringe, or beneath ethical norms. The journal reference for convenience is "Ethics in Engineering Practice: How Easy It Becomes to See in the Dark," Leadership Manage. Eng., 2007, 7(4): 151-157

I was living in River Ridge LA at the time Katrina. River Ridge is located between the airport and city but well outside the zone that was flooded by the failures to the hurricane and water retention systems that existed at the time. I took significant interest at the time in the multiple investigations that were conducted. While the USACE was responsible for the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System (or at least a large part of it) I think it pays for all of us to take notice of what happened and ask can it happen again somewhere else – under somebody else's watch - and how can it be prevented.

ERP Report Calls to Action Summary

Call to action Number 1: Keep safety at the forefront of public priorities.  All Responsible agencies in NO and throughout the nation should re-evaluate their policies and practices to ensure that protection of public safety, health and welfare is the top priority and the infrequent but potentially devastating impacts from hurricanes and flooding.

Call to action Number 3:  Quantify the Risks. The USACE should complete the work necessary to quantify and effectively communicate the risk as soon as possible, and, because risk assessment and communication is not static, should periodically update the assessment of risk. This risk assessment approach should be extended to all areas of the nation that are vulnerable to major losses from hurricanes and flooding.

Call to action Number 3:  Communicate the risks to the public and decide how much risk is acceptable. Local, state, and federal agencies should create and maintain quality programs of public risk communication in New Orleans and other areas threatened by hurricanes and flooding

Call to action Number 4: Rethink the whole system, including land use in New Orleans.  Local, state, and federal leaders should review the overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into  a coherent and well-thought-out system.

Call to action Number 5: Correct the deficiencies. Local, state, and federal leaders should review the overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into a coherent and well-thought-out system.

Call to action Number 6: Put someone in charge. Local, state, and federal leaders should agree to assign to a single individual the responsibility for managing critical hurricane and flood protection systems such as the one in the New Orleans area.

Call to action Number 7: Improve interagency coordination. All agencies involved in the hurricane protection system should implement far better and more effective mechanisms for coordination  and cooperation.

Call to action Number 8: Upgrade engineering design procedures. The engineering community should review and update engineering design procedures for hurricane and flood protection systems to ensure that these updated procedures take all reasonable steps to protect the public safety, health, and welfare.

Call to action Number 9: Bring in independent experts. Agencies responsible for design of hurricane and flood protection systems and other critical life-safety structures should engage independent experts in high-level review of every project.

Call to action Number 10: Place safety first. ASCE, working in partnership with the USACE and other engineering organizations, should reinforce the need to place the safety, health, and welfare of the public first, and should communicate that public safety must always be the highest priority

The short answer is: apparently not.

I am saying this – because back in April 2019 we discussed the issue on Collaborate. The discussion followed the April 11, 2019 E&E News – where the author claimed: New Orleans Levees Sinking after Massive Upgrading.

ASCE's 10 calls to improve upon and learn from the catastrophic disaster caused by the August 2005 Hurricane Katrina (published in the Civil Engineering Magazine, 77(6), 2007) appear to be a general shopping list (although I presume, the EPR report itself have some details on the scientific justification of them). Because, the calls are something appear to be not much different than what one finds in most planning and design guidelines. By the way, the 10^th call appears to be a (somewhat) repetition of the 1^st call.

-----

Dilip

Website

ORCID ID

Google Scholar

It will be days before we know the full extent of the devastation to Louisiana from Hurricane Ida as well as to the other states in the storm's path. Prompted by the eerie timing of Hurricane Ida's landfall, 16 years to the day from when Hurricane Katrina struck, I thought It was timely to pose the following questions.

Are folks aware of the report prepared by the ASCE following Katrina titled What Went Wrong and Why? The report prepared by the Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel (ERP) offers an assessment of what happened to the New Orleans hurricane protection system as a result of Hurricane Katrina-and why it happened. A finding from this report: "The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina also have profound implications for other American communities and a sobering message for people nationwide: we must place the protection of public safety, health, and welfare at the forefront of our nations priorities."

The ERP report contains 10 calls to action (summarized below for convenience). Are the issues behind what went wrong and these suggested fixes limited to New Orleans, the USACE, or do they have more widespread implications? Can these issues happen elsewhere? For those in the know, have they been adequately addressed relative to the New Orleans hurricane protection system?

Is what happened in New Orleans an example of what Bill Hayden in his excellent essay – referenced under the  Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions  thread – describes as being able to see in the dark? in brief, this is about normalizing behaviors and practices that fall on the fringe, or beneath ethical norms. The journal reference for convenience is "Ethics in Engineering Practice: How Easy It Becomes to See in the Dark," Leadership Manage. Eng., 2007, 7(4): 151-157

I was living in River Ridge LA at the time Katrina. River Ridge is located between the airport and city but well outside the zone that was flooded by the failures to the hurricane and water retention systems that existed at the time. I took significant interest at the time in the multiple investigations that were conducted. While the USACE was responsible for the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System (or at least a large part of it) I think it pays for all of us to take notice of what happened and ask can it happen again somewhere else – under somebody else's watch - and how can it be prevented.

ERP Report Calls to Action Summary

Call to action Number 1: Keep safety at the forefront of public priorities.  All Responsible agencies in NO and throughout the nation should re-evaluate their policies and practices to ensure that protection of public safety, health and welfare is the top priority and the infrequent but potentially devastating impacts from hurricanes and flooding.

Call to action Number 3:  Quantify the Risks. The USACE should complete the work necessary to quantify and effectively communicate the risk as soon as possible, and, because risk assessment and communication is not static, should periodically update the assessment of risk. This risk assessment approach should be extended to all areas of the nation that are vulnerable to major losses from hurricanes and flooding.

Call to action Number 3:  Communicate the risks to the public and decide how much risk is acceptable. Local, state, and federal agencies should create and maintain quality programs of public risk communication in New Orleans and other areas threatened by hurricanes and flooding

Call to action Number 4: Rethink the whole system, including land use in New Orleans.  Local, state, and federal leaders should review the overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into  a coherent and well-thought-out system.

Call to action Number 5: Correct the deficiencies. Local, state, and federal leaders should review the overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into a coherent and well-thought-out system.

Call to action Number 6: Put someone in charge. Local, state, and federal leaders should agree to assign to a single individual the responsibility for managing critical hurricane and flood protection systems such as the one in the New Orleans area.

Call to action Number 7: Improve interagency coordination. All agencies involved in the hurricane protection system should implement far better and more effective mechanisms for coordination  and cooperation.

Call to action Number 8: Upgrade engineering design procedures. The engineering community should review and update engineering design procedures for hurricane and flood protection systems to ensure that these updated procedures take all reasonable steps to protect the public safety, health, and welfare.

Call to action Number 9: Bring in independent experts. Agencies responsible for design of hurricane and flood protection systems and other critical life-safety structures should engage independent experts in high-level review of every project.

Call to action Number 10: Place safety first. ASCE, working in partnership with the USACE and other engineering organizations, should reinforce the need to place the safety, health, and welfare of the public first, and should communicate that public safety must always be the highest priority

The short answer is: apparently not.

I am saying this – because back in April 2019 we discussed the issue on Collaborate. The discussion followed the April 11, 2019 E&E News – where the author claimed: New Orleans Levees Sinking after Massive Upgrading.

ASCE's 10 calls to improve upon and learn from the catastrophic disaster caused by the August 2005 Hurricane Katrina (published in the Civil Engineering Magazine, 77(6), 2007) appear to be a general shopping list (although I presume, the EPR report itself have some details on the scientific justification of them). Because, the calls are something appear to be not much different than what one finds in most planning and design guidelines. By the way, the 10^th call appears to be a (somewhat) repetition of the 1^st call.

-----

Dilip

Website

ORCID ID

Google Scholar

It will be days before we know the full extent of the devastation to Louisiana from Hurricane Ida as well as to the other states in the storm's path. Prompted by the eerie timing of Hurricane Ida's landfall, 16 years to the day from when Hurricane Katrina struck, I thought It was timely to pose the following questions.

Are folks aware of the report prepared by the ASCE following Katrina titled What Went Wrong and Why? The report prepared by the Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel (ERP) offers an assessment of what happened to the New Orleans hurricane protection system as a result of Hurricane Katrina-and why it happened. A finding from this report: "The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina also have profound implications for other American communities and a sobering message for people nationwide: we must place the protection of public safety, health, and welfare at the forefront of our nations priorities."

The ERP report contains 10 calls to action (summarized below for convenience). Are the issues behind what went wrong and these suggested fixes limited to New Orleans, the USACE, or do they have more widespread implications? Can these issues happen elsewhere? For those in the know, have they been adequately addressed relative to the New Orleans hurricane protection system?

Is what happened in New Orleans an example of what Bill Hayden in his excellent essay – referenced under the  Surfside Condo Collapse Peripheral Questions  thread – describes as being able to see in the dark? in brief, this is about normalizing behaviors and practices that fall on the fringe, or beneath ethical norms. The journal reference for convenience is "Ethics in Engineering Practice: How Easy It Becomes to See in the Dark," Leadership Manage. Eng., 2007, 7(4): 151-157

I was living in River Ridge LA at the time Katrina. River Ridge is located between the airport and city but well outside the zone that was flooded by the failures to the hurricane and water retention systems that existed at the time. I took significant interest at the time in the multiple investigations that were conducted. While the USACE was responsible for the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System (or at least a large part of it) I think it pays for all of us to take notice of what happened and ask can it happen again somewhere else – under somebody else's watch - and how can it be prevented.

ERP Report Calls to Action Summary

Call to action Number 1: Keep safety at the forefront of public priorities.  All Responsible agencies in NO and throughout the nation should re-evaluate their policies and practices to ensure that protection of public safety, health and welfare is the top priority and the infrequent but potentially devastating impacts from hurricanes and flooding.

Call to action Number 3:  Quantify the Risks. The USACE should complete the work necessary to quantify and effectively communicate the risk as soon as possible, and, because risk assessment and communication is not static, should periodically update the assessment of risk. This risk assessment approach should be extended to all areas of the nation that are vulnerable to major losses from hurricanes and flooding.

Call to action Number 3:  Communicate the risks to the public and decide how much risk is acceptable. Local, state, and federal agencies should create and maintain quality programs of public risk communication in New Orleans and other areas threatened by hurricanes and flooding

Call to action Number 4: Rethink the whole system, including land use in New Orleans.  Local, state, and federal leaders should review the overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into  a coherent and well-thought-out system.

Call to action Number 5: Correct the deficiencies. Local, state, and federal leaders should review the overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into a coherent and well-thought-out system.

Call to action Number 6: Put someone in charge. Local, state, and federal leaders should agree to assign to a single individual the responsibility for managing critical hurricane and flood protection systems such as the one in the New Orleans area.

Call to action Number 7: Improve interagency coordination. All agencies involved in the hurricane protection system should implement far better and more effective mechanisms for coordination  and cooperation.

Call to action Number 8: Upgrade engineering design procedures. The engineering community should review and update engineering design procedures for hurricane and flood protection systems to ensure that these updated procedures take all reasonable steps to protect the public safety, health, and welfare.

Call to action Number 9: Bring in independent experts. Agencies responsible for design of hurricane and flood protection systems and other critical life-safety structures should engage independent experts in high-level review of every project.

Call to action Number 10: Place safety first. ASCE, working in partnership with the USACE and other engineering organizations, should reinforce the need to place the safety, health, and welfare of the public first, and should communicate that public safety must always be the highest priority