Dilip, thanks for this constructive overview of the different acronyms and approaches for managing risk/safety. To the larger community following this discussion, as I work to gain further insight into this new world of S-based vocabulary and approach, I wonder about the maturity of this new approach. I looked at the website that Bill H. posted, https://www.csra.colorado.edu/, and was hoping to find clarity. Unfortunately, I could not find anything useful on the site. Maybe the valuable content is behind a paywall, which is not helpful. I was further puzzled to find SIF defined as Serious Injury and Fatality. See https://www.csra.colorado.edu/uniqueprecursorsofsifs.This is also not helpful. It does not feel like the S-based approach is ready for prime time, and potential users should take notice. Hopefully, somebody will jump in and prove me wrong.
Original Message:
Sent: 08-29-2024 10:50 PM
From: Dilip Barua
Subject: The Things That Hurt People Are Not the Same as the Things That Kill People: Key Differences in the Proximal Causes of Low- and High-Severity Construction Injuries
Mitch, here are something more I like to share.
You are right. All such acronyms are circular in a sense. New acronyms appear as emphasis shifts or as new thinking emerges. They result from the underlying realization that risk is not something that can be eliminated – but rather can be minimized. The question then arises – how to define a certain Safe Tolerable Threshold (STT) during the minimization process. The STT definition varies among industries – and as we are talking about, construction industry is just one of them.
Perhaps a summary list of acronyms will indicate the nature of diversity:
Those having a legal tone
ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable (UK 1974)
ALARA: As Low As Reasonably Achievable (US radiation risk)
SFAIRP: So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (UK, NZ health and safety)
AFAP: As Far As Possible (health Canada)
And, those starting with 'Safety' – are more tuned to scientific nature
SIF: Safety Instrumented Function
SIL: Safety Integrity Level
SIS: Safety Instrumented Systems
SRS: Safety Requirements Specification
SLC: Safety Life Cycle
The difference between the two systems can be noted – risk is as low as possible – while safety is as high as possible. Both are definable in probability scales.
As one can understand, the rationality of finding a satisfactory cost-benefit ratio underlines all STT definitions. But, then there is no uniquely acceptable definition across the board – therefore disputes, court-cases and legal definitions and re-definitions come into the picture.
Dilip
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Dr. Dilip K Barua, Ph.D
Website Links and Profile
Original Message:
Sent: 08-22-2024 07:44 PM
From: Mitchell Winkler
Subject: The Things That Hurt People Are Not the Same as the Things That Kill People: Key Differences in the Proximal Causes of Low- and High-Severity Construction Injuries
Thanks for providing this background reference. Before weighing in on the original question, I'm curious about the background of SIFs, SILs, and SIS and the case for action. This feels like a combination of the well-established bow tie analysis and managing risk to ALARP with new names.
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Mitch Winkler P.E.(inactive), M.ASCE
Houston, TX
Original Message:
Sent: 08-08-2024 02:38 PM
From: Dilip Barua
Subject: The Things That Hurt People Are Not the Same as the Things That Kill People: Key Differences in the Proximal Causes of Low- and High-Severity Construction Injuries
Great to know. Further to the cited, there are some other sources on different safety protocols and terminologies
Here are two that may add to the interest:
An S-Word Worth Knowing
Standardized Leading Safety Indicators
Dilip
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Dr. Dilip K Barua, Ph.D
Website Links and Profile
Original Message:
Sent: 08-06-2024 01:27 PM
From: William Hayden
Subject: The Things That Hurt People Are Not the Same as the Things That Kill People: Key Differences in the Proximal Causes of Low- and High-Severity Construction Injuries
Faced with compelling evidence that the ratio of fatal and nonfatal injuries is not constant,
there has been a desire to identify what is different about SIFs.
Within the safety profession, the idea that the things that hurt people are not the same as the things that kill people
has begun to replace the antiquated view that SIFs will be prevented by addressing LSIs.
Cheers,
Bill
Byby Arnaldo Bayona, S.M.ASCE; Matthew R. Hallowell, A.M.ASCE, and Siddharth Bhandari, A.M.ASCE3
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2024, 150(8): 04024089
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William M. Hayden Jr., Ph.D., P.E., CMQ/OE, F.ASCE
Buffalo, N.Y.
"It is never too late to be what you might have been." -- George Eliot 1819 - 1880
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